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Olson: Article I of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence: The Not-So-General Pr

COMMENTS
ARTICLE I OF THE WYOMING RULES OF EVIDENCE:
THE NOT-SO-GENERAL PROVISIONS
INTRODUCTION
In the interest of uniformity with federal practice the Supreme Court of Wyoming recently adopted, with minor
changes, the Federal Rules of Evidence. Article I of the Wyoming Rules is an exact replica of its federal counterpart, with
the exception of Rule 101.1
The Article is entitled "General Provisions," and, as such,
may escape the attention of the reader. Indeed, a cursory
reading reveals nothing more than what everyone already
knows about the law of evidence. However, the Rules are deceptive in their apparent simplicity, and their usefulness will
often depend upon a clear understanding of their underlying
principles and limitations. It is the purpose of this Comment
to explain the functions of the Rules in Article I and to focus
attention on the various problems which can arise under even
the most rudimentary provisions.
2
RULE 102: PURPOSE AND CONSTRUCTION

One might question the wisdom of an attempt to codify
the myriad rules and standards which make up the law of evidence. 3 It would be unfortunate if a court's ability to arrive
at a reasonable solution to unforeseen evidentiary problems
were hampered by a mechanical and unthinking application
of the Rules. Testimony at the committee hearings on the
Federal Rules indicated some apprehension as to that possibility:
MR. HUTCHINSON. There is one problem that occurs
to me. Since in the past the rules of evidence have
CopyrightQ 1978 by the University of Wyoming.
1. WYO. R. EViD. 101 provides: "These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this
State to the extent and with the exceptions stated in rule 1101." Similarly, FED.
R. EVID. 101 states: "These rules govern proceedings in the courts of the United
States and before United States magistrates, to the extent and with the exceptions
stated in rule 1101."
2. WYO. R. EVID. 102, Purposes and Construction, provides: These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
3. Testimony before Congress at the Senate hearings on the Federal Rules indicated

that the law of evidence had grown to some 1,500,000 cases. Hearings on H. R.
5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974).
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evolved and changed over a period of time, I want to
inquire as to what the effect of putting them into
statutory form will be. Will this effectively freeze
them so that there can be no changes in the rules of
evidence henceforth except by coming back to Congress and asking Congress to amend the statute? 4
The response to Congressman Hutchinson is found in the
directive of Rule 102. The rules of evidence are to be construed to achieve the goals of "truth" and "justice" through
application of the principles of "fairness", "efficiency", and
"growth and development of the law." In this manner, Rule
102 establishes flexibility as the theme5 without granting the
court a "procedural 'wild card' the judge can use to trump
another played by one of the parties at an inopportune moment." Although the Rule is not an explicit grant of discretion,7 other rules authorize considerable latitude of choice in
particular situations. 8
The rule of construction enunciated in Rule 102 is comparable to those stated in the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure' and the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. x0 Like
its counterparts, Rule 102 should be construed as a direction
to avoid defeating the overall purpose of the rules by rigid application of a particular mandate in an inappropriate situation.

RULE 103: RULINGS ON EVIDENCE"
Appellate courts ordinarily will not consider issues that
were never raised at trial, or were not timely raised and there.
4.
5.
6.

120 CONG. REC. 1413 (1974) (remarks of Congressman Hutchison).
102 [01] (1976) [hereinafter
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
cited as WEINSTEIN].
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, 21 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §5023, at 128
(1977) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & GRAHAM], citing Advisor's Note. MAINE

R. EviD. 102:

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

The rule is a guide as to the principles by which the judge is to exercise
his discretion, but not of course a license to disregard the rules to reach a
result he believes to be just.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM § 5023,at 129.
See, e.g., Rules 103(b), 201(c), 403, 608(b), 611(a), 614, 706.
WYo. R. Crv. P. 1. "[T] hese rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action."
WYO. R. CRIM. P. 2. "These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay."

WYO. R. EVID. 103 is as follows:
Rulings on Evidence
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affect-
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fore not considered by the trial court. Rule 103 makes specific this rule regarding objections to the admission or exclusion of evidence. Two major points are made: (1) the responsibility for providing evidence and invoking the rules of exclusion rests with the parties and not the court, and (2) reversals on purely technical grounds not affecting substantial
rights are to be avoided. 12 The basic policy underlying both
these points "is that the rules of evidence are only to be enforced where enforcement is a matter of importance."' 3
Objections
Under our adversary system of justice the burden of producing evidence and objecting to its introduction is imposed
on the parties. Because they are usually represented by counsel "who are presumed to be vigilant in the protection of
their clients' rights, it is the general practice of the courts to
receive whatever may be offered as evidence unless objection
is made to its introduction."14 Rule 103(a)(1) continues this
tradition by placing the initiative on the party to inform the
court promptly of contentions that evidence should be excluded. 5 'Failure to make a timely objection or motion to
ed, and

12.
13.
14.
15.

(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent
from the context within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an
offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the
jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain error affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.
Wyoming Committee Note: Under Rule 103(a), it is not necessary to reoffer evidence which has been suppressed by action of the court on a
pretrial motion, such as a motion in limine or a motion to suppress, or to
make a further objection at the time of trial to evidence which has previously been ruled admissible on such a pretrial motion.
WEINSTEIN
103101], at 103-5.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM § 5032, at 161.
JONES. 4 THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 975. at 1834 (5th ed. 1958).
This is in accord with the generally accepted practice in Wyoming. See WYO. R.
Crv. P. 46:
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary;
but for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the
court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he
desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and
his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a
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strike stating the specific grounds precludes assignment of error on the erroneous admission of that evidence. 16 The evidence received will then be allowed its natural probative
value in the litigation. 7
Specificity: Grounds and Reference
The purpose of a rule which requires objections at the
trial court level is to "expedite finality and economy in litigation" by giving both the offering party and the trial judge an
opportunity to make corrections "which may obviate the
need for further proceedings."'18 In addition, the appearance
of an objection on the record is essential to enable review by
the appellate court. Objections can serve the functions of
alerting the proponent and judge of the nature of the challenge and preserving the issue for an intelligent review on
appeal only if the grounds of the objection are stated with
specificity. Rule 103(a)(1) embodies this notion by requiring
the "specific ground" to appear on the record if it was not
"apparent from the context."19
Because the rule does not define the degree of specificity
required, it may be difficult for counsel to determine how to
choose the words which will protect his client's rights on appeal. 20 The only black-letter law is that the overworked litany
ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does
not thereafter prejudice him.
WYO. R. CRIM. P. 48 is to the same effect.
16. This too is consistent with Wyoming practice and procedure. Weber v. Johnston
Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 976 (Wyo. 1974). An exception to the rule may
exist where testimony is presented in violation of the parol evidence rule. The Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that since the parol evidence rule is a matter of
substantive law, the reviewing court may consider the propriety of admitting the
evidence even where a timely objection has not been made. State v. Cheever, 71
Wyo. 303, 257 P.2d 337, 340 (1953); but see, Lansen v. Sjogren, 67 Wyo. 447, 226
P.2d 177, 186 (1951) in which the court found a waiver of the parol evidence rule
objection where the testimony as to the oral modification of the contract "was admitted without objection and a good deal of it was brought out by cross-examination on the part of counsel for appellants."
17. However, a verdict cannot be based upon irrelevant evidence received without objection. Hirsch v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 308 F.2d 562, 567 (9th
Cir. 1962) ("Failure to object may make incompetent evidence competent, but it
cannot make irrelevant evidence relevant.").
103(02], at 103-11.
18. WEINSTEIN
19. The Wyoming Supreme Court has agreed that general objections are insufficient to
preserve an issue for appeal. Murdock v. State, 351 P.2d 674, 679 (Wyo. 1960).
However, if evidence is inadmissible for any purpose a general objection may be
sufficient. Thex v. Shreve, 38 Wyo. 285, 267 P. 92, 94-95 (1928).
20. It should be noted that Rule 103 does not forbid the use of general objections at
trial. The rule is directed toward the creation of grounds for appealing an adverse
ruling. A trial court may sustain a general objection and will be upheld on appeal if
any basis for the ruling can be found. On the other hand, a trial court's action in
overruling a general objection will also be affirmed. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 52,
at 116 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
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of "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial" is insufficient to
preserve an objection for review. As stated by one commentator, "the trial judge is justified in treating it as a confession of
ignorance and is not required to stop the trial to see if any
real grounds for objection exist."'1
The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rule has defined
the objective of the requirement as "to alert [the court] to
the proper course of action and enable opposing counsel to
take proper corrective measures. ' 22 An objection which
serves this purpose should be sufficient to preserve the point
for review. However, it is not always possible to predict the
way in which a court will view the specificity (or lack thereof)
of a particular objection.
Weinstein discusses two federal cases, Een v. Consolidated
Freightways2 3 and Blair v. United States,24 to illustrate how
appellate courts can use either a technical or flexible approach in assessing the specificity of an objection. 25 In Een v.
Consolidated Freightways, a personal injury action arising
from a motor vehicle collision, defendants called a law enforcement officer who had investigated the scene of the accident as a witness. After he had testified about his investigation and observations, the officer was asked if he had formed
an opinion as to the point of impact. Plaintiff objected to the
question as "incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, calling for
speculation, guess and conjecture, obviously invading the proprovince of the jury, calling for a conclusion." This objection
was overruled, and in affirming the action of the trial judge,
the appellate court noted:
The general objection that the question was "incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, calling for speculation,
guess and conjecture" was too general to call anything sharply to the attention of the court and no error could be predicated on the ruling on such objection 6
Evidently, an objection which either questioned the qualification of the witness or suggested that the question propound21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

WRIGHT & GRAHAM § 5036, at 179.
FED. R. EVin. 103, Adv. Comm. Note, subdivision (a).
220 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1955).
401 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
WEINSTEIN 103r021. at 103-24 to 103-26.
Een v. Consolidated Freightways, supra note 23, at 87.
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ed was not a proper subject for expert testimony would have
been sufficient.2 7 However, the appellate court chose not to
stretch the objection to include these grounds.
A less technical approach is illustrated by Blair v. United
States, 28 an appeal from a conviction for armed robbery. Defense counsel had objected to the introduction of statements
made by the accused:
My objection, if it please the Court, is based upon the
reason for getting this interrogation, the man wasn't
advised of his rights .... I think if you are eliciting by
the policeman statements from Suggs or any other defendant, there are certain rights.29
The trial court overruled the objection and on appeal the government argued that defense counsel had failed to object to
the evidence "with adequate clarity." The Court of Appeals
disagreed, and reversed the conviction on the basis of a Miranda violation :30
Where the question is as fundamental as admissibility
in a criminal trial of a pre-trial statement by a defendant, counsel may properly assume that even a brief
objection presenting the essence of his contention
will receive the considered attention of the trial judge
without need for a detailed particularization and citations .31
The precedential value of the Een and Blair cases is minimal for predicting the degree of specificity required. Weinstein suggests evidence rulings are often a "peg to hang a reversal on" where the court "feels an injustice has been
done." 32 Indeed, in the Een case, the court indicated the verdict was clearly correct on the state of the evidence, while
in Blair the constitutional rights of the defendant were at
stake.
An aspect of the rule of specificity is that an appeal of an
adverse ruling may be taken only to the extent of the grounds
27.

Id. at 87-88.

28.

Blair v. United States, supra note 24.

29. Id. at 391.
30.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), had been decided several months prior

33.

Een v. Consolidated Freightways, supra note 23, at 88.

to the trial.
31. Blair v. United States, supra note 24, at 391.
32. WEINSTELN 103[021, at 103-24.
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stated in the objection. 4 Examples of this principle include:
(1) an objection to a proper question will not reach an improper answer,3 (2) an objection to the foundation for expert testimony will be insufficient to challenge the "education, training and experience of the witness," 36 and (3) a
hearsay objection to testimony with respect to custom will
not preserve an objection to the foundation of the testimony.37 The reasonableness of this requirement is apparent
when the consequences of the alternative are considered.
Without such a rule, litigants would be able to appeal on
grounds which were never asserted at trial and the finality of
judgments would always be in question.
In addition to stating the grounds of the objection with
specificity, counsel must also be explicit with reference to
the particular evidence sought to be excluded. If part of the
evidence is admissible and the opponent does not separate
the objectionable from the competent, a trial court's decision
to receive all the evidence will rarely be disturbed.3 "It is
not the judge's duty to sever the bad parts if some are good." '1
Moreover, if evidence received is admissible for one purpose
but not for another, it is the responsibility of the objecting
party to bring this to the attention of the court. A general
objection will normally not suffice. 40 The reason is the same:
specificity of reference is necessary to allow the proponent
and the judge an opportunity to cure the problem at trial,
and, if necessary, to provide the appellate court with an adequate record on review.
Timeliness
Rule 103(a)(1) also requires an objection to be "timely"
if error is to be predicated on the ruling of the trial court. An
objection is timely if it is made when the grounds to object
41
first become apparent.
The justification for the rule of timeliness is a consideration of fairness. A party should not be allowed to gamble on
34.

LOUISELL & MUELLER, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8, at 41 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as LOUISELL & MUELLER].

35. Henderson v. Coleman, 19 Wyo. 183, 115 P. 439, 449 (1911), rehearingdenied,
115 P. 1136 (1911).
36.

State Highway Comm'n v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606, 607 (Wyo. 1964).

37. Murdock v. State, 351 P.2d 674, 679 (Wyo. 1960).
38. Meade v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 177, 7 S.W.2d 1052 (1928).
39. McCORMICK § 52, at 117.
40. Id.
41. LOUISELL & MUELLER § 8, at 33-34; WEINSTEIN
103[02], at 103-16.
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the possibility of a favorable answer to an improper question,
2
and then object only if the response proves to be harmful.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has expressed a similar view:
We do not intend to put a stamp of approval on trial
tactics which have the effect of allowing a party to
speculate on the verdict with error tucked in his brief
case unless the verdict be favorable. In such a case,
the party will be deemed to have waived the irregularity.,
An objection to testimony will usually be made as soon
as the question is asked and before an answer is given. Situations arise, however, when a prompt objection is not possible.
For example, a proper question may elicit an unanticipated
and improper response, or an eager witness may blurt the answer to an improper question before the opponent has had an
opportunity to object." Under these circumstances the
grounds for objection does not appear until after the testimony is received, and an objection and motion to strike
should suffice if it is made as soon as the error is manifest. 5
Rule 103 is addressed to trial objections, but there are
several situations in which pretrial action is necessary to exclude evidence.46 First, a motion to exclude evidence illegally
obtained must ordinarily be made before trial. 47 Second,
with regard to deposition testimony in civil cases, an objection on grounds "which might have been obviated or removed"
if presented at the time the deposition was taken is deemed
to have been waived if not made at that time. 8 Finally, a
motion in limine is sometimes appropriate in civil litigation.
This practice is neither require d nor precluded by Rule 103.41
Offer of Proof
If the trial court excludes evidence upon an objection the
42. MCcORMICK § 52, at 113.
43.

Joly v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 502 P.2d 362, 364 (Wyo. 1972), quoting with approv-

al, Herren v. Hawks, 139 Mont. 440,365 P.2d 641,644-45 (1961).
44. MCCORMICK § 52,at 113.
45. Where evidence is admitted conditionally under Rule 104(b) and the condition is
never fulfilled, a motion to strike must be made when the failure of the connection
becomes apparent. This will ordinarily be at the close of the proponent's case, or at
least before the case goes to the jury. LOUISELL & MUELLER § 8, at 38-39.
46.
47.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 8, at 34-35.
WYO. R. CRIM. P. 49(e); see Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 859 (Wyo. 1975) where
it is stated: "The motion shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did
not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion."

48. WYO. R. Crv. P. 32(d)(3)(A).
49.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 8, at 35.
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proponent will ordinarily make an "offer of proof." 50 Rule
103(a)(2) requires such an offer for the purpose of appeal
unless the nature of the excluded evidence "was apparent
51
from the context within which the questions were asked."
The offer of proof serves essentially the same function as
the objection. It advises the trial court of the nature and character of the offered evidence so that a proper ruling may be
made, and it provides a sufficiently detailed record for the reviewing court in the event of an appeal.
Read literally, the language of the rule seems to suggest
that an offer of proof is sufficient if it simply makes known
to the court the substance of the proffered evidence. Unlike
the subsection governing objections, there is no mention of
timeliness, statement of grounds, or appearance on the record. 52 However, if the rule is to satisfy the objectives it was
designed to accomplish, these requirements seem equally applicable to offers of proof. 3 Moreover, Rule 46 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 54 and Rule 48 of the Wyoming
See Ladd, The Need in Iowa of an Offer of Excluded Testimony for Appeal, 18
IOWA L. REV. 304,318 n.28 (1932). Four methods of offering excluded testimony
have been recapitulated by Dean Ladd:
Summary of Methods of Making Offer: (1) Dictation of statement into
the record of the testimony anticipated from the excluded question. This
This statement is properly made at
is the most common procedure ....
the reporter's desk so that it may be heard by the court and opposing
counsel, if he desires, but not heard by the jury or witness. In the latter
respects this procedure is frequently abused. . . . (2) Introduction of
statement written by examining counsel containing the answer the witness would give, in the opinion of the questioner, if permitted to testify.
(3) A written statement of the witness's testimony signed by the witness
and offered as part of the record. This would occur principally when witness was friendly and available before trial and the testimonial issue is
known as a pivotal problem during preparation for trial. It is desirable
when matter of competency or privilege of witness is an issue, for then
the excluded testimony may be easily presented in the record. It would
probably not be available on cross-examination. It is suggested in using
this and the preceding method that the writing be marked as an exhibit
and introduced into the record for proper identification on appeal. (4)
Request the court to excuse the jury temporarily, examine the witness
before the court, and have the answers reported in the record. If it were
not for the inconvenience, this would be by far the most desirable method. It is the only method of demonstrating the actuality of the error of
exclusion of real testimony given under oath in the trial. It is especially
desirable on cross-examination where it is indeed presumptive for counsel to dictate a statement of what an unfavorable witness will say. This
and the preceding method of offer are the only methods that truly approximate meeting the imaginary error theory of offers.
51. This has always been the rule in Wyoming, see, e.g., Watson v. Klindt, 73 Wyo.
402, 280 P.2d 282, 283 (1955); Taylor v. McDonald, 409 P.2d 762, 763 (Wyo.
1966).
52. WRIGHT & GRAHAM § 5040, at 209.
53. Marchessini & Co. v. Robinson, 287 F. Supp. 728, 731-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 40 F.R.D. 96, 100 (N.D. Ill.
1966).
54. WYO. R. CIV. P. 46. Exceptions Unnecessary.
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; but

50.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 8

564

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIII

Rules of Criminal Procedure 55 each require timeliness and
statement of grounds for any offer of proof in response to a
ruling excluding evidence. There is no reason to believe Rule
103(a)(2), even if construed narrowly, would change these requirements. 56 Of course, if the offer of proof does not appear
of record, there is no way for an appellate court to discern
whether or not "a substantial right of the party is affected."
Several additional points should be noted with respect to
offers of proof. First, under Wyoming law a party has an absolute right to make an offer." There is no need to request
permission of the court.5 " Second, as with objections, an offer of proof must be specific. If a party offers an exhibit as a
whole which contains both admissible and inadmissible evidence, the judge may properly reject it in its entirety. 9 The
court is not required "to separate the wheat from the chaff." 60
Third, an offer of conditionally relevant evidence must be accompanied by an offer to prove the connecting fact. 1 Finally, the requirement of an offer of proof is usually relaxed on
cross-examination where the response to the question cannot
62
be anticipated by counsel.
Error:Harmless,Prejudicial,Plain
Rule 103(a) leaves intact the "harmless error" rule developed by the courts by providing that error may not be predicated on an evidentiary ruling unless a substantial right of the
party is affected. The Advisory Committee to the Federal

55.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it
is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is
made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires
the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his
grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling
or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not
thereafter prejudice him.
WYo. R. CRIM. P. 48. Exceptions Unnecessary.
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary and for all
purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made
or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the
court to take or his objection to the action of the court and the grounds
therefor; but if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order,
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him.
See LOUISELL & MUELLER § 13.
Vanover v. Vanover, 75 Wyo. 55, 307 P.2d 117, 122 (1957).
Jones v. Clark, 418 P.2d 792, 799 (Wyo. 1966).
Estate of Carey v. Smith, 504 P.2d 793, 799 (Wyo. 1972).
Id.
In re Patrick's Estate, 397 P.2d 273, 278 (Wyo. 1964).
MCcORMICK § 51, at 110. However, an offer of proof may be required where the
questions propounded are not truly exploratory. LOUISELL & MUELLER § 12, at
70.
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Rules of Evidence noted that "[t] he rule does not purport to
change the law with respect to harmless error."' 63 The law of
harmless error as it stands in this jurisdiction will similarly
survive implementation of Rule 103.64
The leading United States Supreme Court decision on the
subject is Kotteakos v. United States. 5 Kotteakos involved a
conspiracy prosecution in which only one conspiracy was
charged but eight separate ones were proved. The schemes
were related in kind and connected by the fact that one man
participated in all of them. The pattern was characterized by
the Court as " 'separate spokes meeting at a common center'
...without the rim of the wheel to enclose the spokes." 6 6 Despite this variance in proof, the jury was instructed that if
they found from the evidence the existence of a conspiracy
"then the acts or the statements of any of those whom you
so find to be conspirators ... may be considered by you in
evidence as against all of the defendants whom you so find to
be members of the conspiracy." 6 7 The issue before the court
was whether the error in this instruction was harmless, as
urged by the government, or prejudicial to the defendant.
Justice Rutledge, writing for the majority, recognized the
futility of attempting to formulate a precise standard which
63.

64.

65.
66.
67.

FED. R. EvID. 103, Adv. Comm. Note, Subdivision (a). Compare, MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE Rule 6 (1942) which defines the standard by which harmless and
prejudicial error are determined as follows:
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of
evidence unless
(b) the court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is
of the opinion that the admitted evidence should have been excluded on the ground stated and probably had a substantial influence in
bringing about the verdict or finding.
Under Wyoming law, harmless error is defined generally as that which does not affect the "substantial rights" of the party.
WYO. R. CIV. P. 61. Harmless Error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the
court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting
aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
WYo. R. Civ. P. 72(g) Immaterial Errors Disregarded.
No judgment or final order shall be reversed or affected by reason of any
error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the
substantial rights of the adverse party.
WYO. R. CRIM. P. 49(a) Harmless Error.
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
328 U.S. 750 (1946).
Id. at 755.
Id. at 770 (emphasis by the court).
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would accurately define the border between harmless and
prejudicial error. "By its very nature no standard of perfection can be attained. But one of fair approximation can be
achieved."
The test, as concluded by the Court, is whether
the appellate court can say with "fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action
from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially
swayed by error." 6 9 The reviewing court is not to decide on
the basis of the "correctness" of the judgment or speculate
on the probable result of a new trial, but must examine the
effect of the error on the proceedings below. Although Kotteakos was a criminal trial, the reasoning and approach of the
Supreme Court also seems to be an appropriate guideline in
7
civil cases. 1
Wyoming case law sheds little additional light on the elusive boundary between harmless and prejudicial error. However, there are at least two kinds of error which will almost
certainly be deemed harmless. First, if the evidence erroneously excluded in a jury trial would have been merely cumulative, the error will not be grounds for reversal. 7' Second, if
evidence is erroneously admitted in a non-jury trial, the decision will not be disturbed if there is sufficient admissible evidence to support the findings.32 In other situations, the definition of prejudicial error remains vague. 73 Undoubtedly, the
analysis of Kotteakos is as precise as can be made. The determination of whether a substantial right of the party has
been affected will have to be made on a case-by-case basis, as
well it should.
Harmless ConstitutionalError
Constitutional error presents a different problem. The
Kotteakos court hinted that constitutional error might be reversable per se.74 This is not the rule, but the standard for de68. Id. at 761.
69. Id. at 765.
70. This is especially true considering a further refinement of the opinion:
Necessarily the character of the proceeding, what is at stake upon its outcome, and the relation of the error asserted to casting the balance for decision on the case as a whole, are material factors in judgment. Id. at 762.
71. X v. Y, 482 P.2d 688, 691 (Wyo. 1971); Colwell v. Anderson, 438 P.2d 448, 451

(Wyo. 1968).
72. In re Shreve, 432 P.2d 271, 273 (Wyo. 1967); York v. Torbert, 355 P.2d 205, 209
(Wyo. 1960).
73. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Triangle Dev. Co., 369 P.2d 864, 869 (Wyo.
1962); Logan v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 400 P.2d 488, 494 (Wyo. 1965);
State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551,557 (1956).
74. Kotteakos v. United States, supra note 65, at 764.
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termining the degree of prejudice necessary for a reversal is
7 5 is cited by the Adless than clear. Chapman v. California
visory Committee to the Federal Rules as the controlling decision on the subject of constitutional error. 76 Chapman provides a two part test for making the determination. The first
question is "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." If this possibility exists, the court must conclude
that the error is prejudicial unless it can "declare a belief that
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.""
Despite the reference made by the Advisory Committee,
the status of the Chapman rule is in doubt in view of a subsequent Supreme Court decision. The issue in Harrington v.
California78 was the effect of the erroneous admission of the
79
confessions of two codefendants who did not take the stand.
The court purported to follow Chapman in holding the error
to be harmless, but based the decision upon its conclusion
that the weight of the evidence apart from the confessions
was overwhelming. 80 The analysis is not the same as that of
the Chapman decision. In Chapman the focus was on the impact of the evidence received in error. The test was whether
the appellate court could determine beyond a reasonable
doubt that it had no effect on the verdict. The approach of
the Harrington court, on the other hand, was to look at the
remainder of the evidence which, if overwhelming, would
render the constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The difference between the two decisions is significant,
and the consequence of the change in focus may be demonstrated by applying the Chapman test to the error in Harrington. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to decide beyond
a reasonable doubt that the introduction of a confession had
no effect on a jury verdict. A strict application of the Chapman rule would appear to require a reversal in Harrington.By
its scrutiny of the effect of the evidence erroneously received
apart from the weight of the remainder of the evidence, the
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

386 U.S. 18 (1967).
FED. R. EVID. 103. Adv. Comm. Note, Subdivision (a).
Chapman v. California, supra note 75, at 23-24.
395 U.S. 250 (1969).
See Bruten v. United States, 391.U.S. 123 (1968).
Harrington v. Uriited States, supra note 78, at 254.
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Chapman test creates a strong presumption that constitutional error is prejudicial. Under the Harringtonapproach a court
can more readily find an otherwise serious constitutional error to be harmless where the remainder of the evidence is
overwhelming. To this extent the rigorous test of Chapman
seems to have been modified by Harrington.
Plain Error
Rule 103(d) makes it clear that despite failure to comply
with the directives of Subdivision (a), reversal may be possible
under the "plain error" doctrine. The trial court may, sua
sponte or in response to a tardy request, take corrective action either during or after the trial. An appellate court may
take notice of plain errors not questioned below whether or
not they are asserted on appeal. 81 Although the doctrine is
theoretically applicable to both civil and criminal cases, as a
82
practical matter it is rarely invoked in civil actions.
Various attempts have been made to define the magnitude
of error that warrants reversal despite failure to comply with
83 It
the usual procedures for preserving the right to appeal.
has been described as "error both obvious and substantial," 84
"serious and manifest,"8 5 "seriously prejudicial error," 8 6 or
"grave errors which seriously affect substantial rights of the
accused." 87 The Wyoming Supreme Court has described plain
error as "fundamental error,"8 8 or error that would "seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." '8 9 The descriptions do not provide much
guidance, but rather "give the distinct impression that 'plain
error' is a concept appellate courts find impossible to define,
save that they know it when they see it."0 The Wyoming
Court does not see it very often and this should not change
under the new Rules of Evidence.
81. LOUISELL & MUELLER § 21, at 117-119; see also, WYO. R. CRIM. P. 49(b) which
provides:
Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although
they were not brought to the attention of the court.
82. In Wyoming civil cases the plain error doctrine may be limited to situations in
which the lower court lacked jurisdiction. Guggenmos v. Tom Seaxl-Frank McCue,
Inc., 481 P.2d 48, 51 (Wyo. 1971).
83.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 21, at 119-21.

84. Sykes v. United States, 353 F.2d 607, 612 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
977.
85. Freutralle v. United States, 209 F.2d 159, 163 (5th Cir. 1954).
86. Cleaver v. United States, 238 F.2d 766, 770 (10th Cir. 1957).
87. Wright v. United States, 301 F.2d 412,414 (10th Cir. 1962).
88. Pixley v. State, 406 P.2d 662,669 (Wyo. 1965).
89. Hays v. State, 552 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Wyo. 1974).
90.

WRIGHT, 3 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 856, at 373 (1969).
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104: PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 9 '

Rule 104 is the Pandora's box of Article I. Its innocuous
and lucid appearance provides an effective camouflage for a
number of unresolved issues. Before these problems are confronted, however, a brief overview of the scope of the rule is
appropriate.
Admissibility of evidence often depends upon the resolution of a preliminary question of law or fact. Rule 104 divides
these into questions of competency and questions of relevancy, and the responsibility for their resolution is allocated
between judge and jury.
Subdivision (a) designates questions of competency as issues to be determined by the judge. These include questions
as to the qualifications of a witness, the existence of a privilege, and any other question concerning the admissibility of
evidence which is not referred to the jury by another provision. In making these determinations, the court is "not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
92
privileges."
There are at least three reasons why questions of competency should be decided by the judge alone. First, a jury of
laymen does not have the legal acumen necessary to view the
evidence in two different lights and decide both ultimate
91.

WYO. R. EVID. 104 is as follows:
Preliminary Questions
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions
of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject
to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of
the condition.
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all

cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary
matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require or, when an accused is a witness, if he so requests.
(d)
Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, subject himself to cross-examination as to other issues in the case.
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to in-

troduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
92.

The supposition is that the trial judge, unlike the jury, can be relied upon to take

into account the inherent weaknesses of evidence which does not measure up to
the standards governing admissibility. On the other hand, "[p1 rivileged communications while clearly relevant, are excluded because of a legislative determination
that any benefit derived from obtaining the truth is substantially outweighed by
the social charm resulting from their disclosure. Obviously, any disclosure will de-

feat the purpose of the exclusionary rule ... " WEINSTEIN
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questions and questions of competency. Second, it is highly
probable that a jury would find it impossible to disregard the
inadmissible evidence even if they were able to keep separate
the preliminary and ultimate questions. Third, the administrative problems would be insurmountable if the jury were
responsible for deciding preliminary questions of competency .P
Preliminary questions of conditional relevancy do not
present such problems; thus, their determination is left to the
jury under Subdivision (b) of the rule. 94 These questions arise
whenever the probative value of proffered evidence depends
upon the existence of another fact. For example, if A sues C
corporation on a promissory note executed by B, and introduces evidence of the note executed by B, the relevance of
the note depends upon a showing that B is the agent of C corporation. Under Rule 104(b), evidence of the note will be introduced upon, or subject to the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the agency. As with most
questions of conditional relevancy, the existence of the agency is a simple factual matter which the jury is quite competent to determine. This leaves the difficulty of expunging evidence from the minds of the jurors when the burden of proof
has not been met, but it is felt that the jury can understand
concepts of relevancy and there is no great danger that irrelevant evidence will be misused.9 5
Subdivisions (c) and (d) of Rule 104 are concerned primarily with protection of criminal defendants in the determination of preliminary issues. Because of the obvious danger
of prejudice, hearings on the admissibility of confessions
must always be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. 9 6
93.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 26, at 157.

94. The jury is the final arbiter on questions of admissibility under several other rules
governing specific instances of conditional relevancy. See WYO. R. EVID. 602 (Lack

95.

of Personal Knowledge), Rule 901 (Requirement of Authentication or Identification), Rule 1008 (Functions of Court and Jury).
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has recognized the dichotomy between incompetence and irrelevance, the need to keep incompetent evidence from the jury, and
the relative harmlessness of introducing irrelevant evidence in Holm v. State, 404

P.2d 740, 743 (Wyo. 1965). "Matters that are irrelevant or immaterial may only
unnecessarily encumber trial proceedings. Incompetent evidence on the contrary

brings before the trier of fact evidence which is unauthenticated and therefore unworthy of belief."
Rule 103(b) does not limit the discretion of the judge to control the order of
presentation under Rule 611(a) or to exclude relevant evidence under Rule 403
where the probative value is "outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."
96. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388 (1964), where the United States Supreme
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Hearings on other matters must be likewise conducted in two
situations: (1) Where the "accused is a witness, if he so requests," and (2) where, as determined by the court, the "interests of justice" so require.
If the accused decides to testify on a preliminary matter,
subdivision (d) provides that he does not thereby "subject
97
himself to cross-examination as to other issues in the case."
However, as noted by the Advisory Committee to the Federal
Rule, the provision "is not . .. intended to immunize the accused from cross-examination where, in testifying about a
preliminary issue, he injects other issues into the hearing."
Preliminary Questions and Ultimate Issues
Despite the sound reasoning behind the division of authority in Rule 104 and the sensible results which ordinarily follow, there remain a number of unsolved problems. One troublesome situation arises when a preliminary question to be
determined by the judge coincides with an ultimate issue in
the case. Consider the dilemma of the court faced with the
following facts: In a murder trial it is known that the crime
was commited by X and the sole issue before the jury is the
identity of the defendant with X. Defense counsel calls Mrs.
X to the stand for the purpose of testifying that the defendant is not her husband. Objection is made on the grounds
that a wife cannot testify for or against her husband. The
court must now decide the question of competency, but if
the testimony is excluded, the ruling on the preliminary question becomes a determination by the judge that the accused
is in fact X, and therefore guilty of the crime. On the other

97.

Court held unconstitutional a New York practice whereby the preliminary question
of the voluntariness of a confession was submitted for a determination by the jury:
Under the New York procedure, the fact of a defendant's confession is
solidly implanted in the jury's mind, for it has not only heard the confession, but it has been instructed to consider and judge its voluntariness
and is in position to assess whether it is true or false. If it finds the confession involuntary, does the jury-indeed, can it-then disregard the confession in accordance with its instructions? If there are lingering doubts
about the sufficiency of the other evidence, does the jury unconsciously
lay them to rest by resort to the confession? Will uncertainty about the
sufficiency of the other evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt actually result in acquittal when the jury knows the defendant
has given a truthful [but coerced] confession?
This safeguard is particularly essential considering the wide sphere of cross-examination authorized under WYO. R. EVID. 611(b):
Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to the
subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.
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hand, if the testimony is admitted, the evidentiary ruling has
the effect of a decision by the court that the defendant is not
X and did not commit the crime. In the actual case the judge
ruled the testimony inadmissible, resulting in the conviction
of the defendant.98
Admittedly, the case is unusual, but the problem which
it so graphically illustrates is not extraordinary. It recurs in a
conspiracy trial every time a declaration of an alleged coconspirator is offered as an admission of a party opponent under
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) 9 There must be a determination that a
conspiracy exists of which the defendant is a part before the
statement may be introduced. If the defendant is found to be
a part of the conspiracy, then he is guilty of the conspiracy
charge. This coincidence of preliminary and ultimate issues
raises grave questions as to the proper coordination of the
roles of judge and jury.
The question can logically be described as one of conditional relevancy, but presenting the issue to the jury for their
determination raises a further problem. If the testimony is
admitted conditionally and the jury is instructed to disregard
it unless they are satisfied the defendant's role in the conspiracy has been proved, the jury will, in effect, have been instructed not to consider the evidence unless they first find
the defendant guilty of the charge.1°°
The better resolution is that the question is one for the
judge under Rule 104(a). 01' Although by making the preliminary determination the court is also passing upon an ultimate
issue in the case, it is not necessarily invading the province of
the jury. The jury is still free to weigh the evidence, and the
"parties are not deprived of a jury trial on the ultimate issue.' 10 2 The judge is merely determining the admissibility of
evidence, and so long as the basis for his decision is not communicated to the jury, it should not unduly affect their deliberations.
98. State v. Lee, 127 La. 1077, 54 So. 356 (1911).
99. WYO. R. EVID. 801(d) Statements which are not hearsay. (2) Admission by party.
opponent. (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
100. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718,736 (9th Cir. 1963).
101. See United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v.
Calabro, 449 F.2d 885, 889 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Herrera, 407 F. Supp.
766, 771 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
102. WEINSTEIN t 104[02],at 104-23.
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Preliminary Questions: Standard of Proof
When preliminary questions of fact are deemed to be
matters of competency for the court, the question arises as to
the standard of proof required to establish admissibility of
the proffered evidence. Rule 104 provides no guideline on
this matter and the answer must be gleaned from other
sources.
Because criminal convictions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it has been suggested that a similar standard
of proof should be adopted for the resolution of preliminary
questions of fact in a criminal trial. 0 3 This has been almost
universally rejected by the courts, which have adopted standards described as a "preponderance"' 114 of the evidence, "sufficiency" of the evidence, 0 1 or evidence that "prima facie"
establishes the existence of the preliminary fact. 1 6 With respect to the admission of out-of-court statements of a coconspirator, at least one court has made a distinction between
the standard of proof necessary to submit a conspiracy charge
to the jury and the standard of proof necessary to admit the
statement, holding that the evidentiary ruling does not require a showing sufficient to support a guilty verdict on a
conspiracy charge.17
The effect of Federal Rule 104(a) upon the standard of
proof required for a preliminary question has been discussed
by several courts. 0 8 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is of the opinion that Rule 104(a), by requiring the judge
to determine questions of admissibility, demands a higher
standard of proof than the prima facie standard.109 By contrast, the Wyoming Supreme Court has adhered to the prima
facie standard, at least on the question of the admissibility of
declarations of a coconspirator.110
103. See Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 271, 274 (1974).

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 489 (1972); Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483. 495 (Wyo. 1975).
United States v. Herrera, supra note 101, at 770.
Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1334 (Wyo. 1977).
United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1299 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1299 n.4; United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1977).
United States v. Petrozziello, supra note 108, at 23. "[F] inding a prima facie case
is not the same as 'determining' that a conspiracy existed. A higher standard is implicit in the judge's new role."
Jasch v. State, supra note 106, at 1334.
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Court Is Not Bound by the Rules of Evidence
A further difficulty is presented by the provision in Rule
104(a) which allows the court, in making its determination,
to hear any relevant evidence unhampered by the exclusionary rules. The judge may consider hearsay and other inadmissible evidence for the purpose of determining the preliminary
question before it."' Normally, this will present no difficulties because the trial judge, with his legal training and experience, can be relied upon to "be fully cognizant of the inherent
weakness of evidence by affidavit or hearsay and will take
such weakness into account when evaluating its weight on the
2
preliminary question."
The problem arises, once again, within the context of preliminary questions on the admissibility of the declaration of
coconspirators. The que-tion is whether Rule 104(a) means
that the admissibility of the declarations may be based upon
evidence contained within the declaration without independent proof of the existence of a conspiracy. The traditional
rule articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Glasser is that the declaration is admissible against a defendant only if there is "proof aliunde that [the defendant] is
connected with the conspiracy. Otherwise hearsay would lift
itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence." 113
If the standard of proof required in the preliminary determination is something lower than the preponderance standard, it is conceivable that the authority vested in the court
to consider hearsay makes it possible to admit the evidence
solely upon the basis of the declaration itself. This, of course,
is assuming the declaration appears to be trustworthy. One
court has taken the position that Rule 104(a) has overruled
United States v. Glasser to the extent it held that the declaration itself could not be used to prove the conspiracy."' However, the court added, Glasser "still stands as a warning to
trial judges that such statements should ordinarily be given
little weight."" 5 Nonetheless, it is possible the rule will per111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

United States v. Lee, 541 F.2d 1145, 1146 (5th Cir. 1976).
WEINSTEIN
104[02], at 104-24.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74 (1942).
United States v. Martorano, supra note 101, at 12.
Id.
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mit admission of such declarations upon a less substantial
showing of independent evidence than was formerly required.
Considering the ease with which the Wyoming Supreme Court
is able to discern the existence of a conspiracy, 6 Rule 104
may serve to diminish further the protection of a defendant
against the admission of hearsay evidence.
RULE 105: LIMITED ADMISSIBILIrY"

7

The situation often arises wherein proffered evidence is
competent and relevant for one purpose but inadmissible for
another. The usual practice of the courts is to admit the evidence and, if the opponent so requests, instruct the jury of
its limited purpose.11 8 Rule 105 continues this tradition. The
justification for this liberal rule of admissiblity is a belief that
"the more information available to the trier of fact, the greater will be its knowledge of the events in question and the
more likely will it be that resolution of the factual disputes
will approximate the truth." 9
Limiting instructions, however, may not always be sufficient to restrict the use of the evidence to its proper purpose.
This is especially true in a criminal trial where two or more
defendants are joined and damaging evidence is introduced
against one which is inadmissible against the other. Under
these circumstances, Rule 105 should be read in connection
with Rule 403 which grants the trial court discretion to exclude the evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury." Exclusion of evidence may in
fact be required rather than permissive where the risk of pre116. See Note, CriminalProcedure-The CoconspiratorException to the Hearsay Rule,
13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 629 (1978).
117. WYO. R. EvLD. 105 is as follows:
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose
but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted,
the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope
and instruct the jury accordingly.
118. Valerie v. State, 429 P.2d 317, 318 (Wyo. 1967); Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Westman, 20 Wyo. 143, 122 P. 89, 93 (1912); MCCORMICK § 59, at 135-36. See also,
LOUISELL & MUELLER § 45, at 342-43:
There are sound reasons for requiring the opponent to request the trial
judge to limit the scope of the evidence by instructing the jury.... This
manner of proceeding appropriately leaves to the opposing trial counsel
the option of concluding that, as a matter of strategy, he is better off
without an instruction than with one, in that an instruction would serve
only to remind the jury of what it has heard or to re-emphasize the evidence in the minds of the jurors, and perhaps to suggest to the jury a use
for the evidence which is best left unmentioned.
119. WEINSTEIN 105[02], at 105-10.
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judice is high.1 20 Severance may be the appropriate remedy in
some of these situations, and Rule 105 does121not limit the discretion of the judge to order separate trials.
One situation where the danger of prejudice is great is
where evidence is introduced for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant in a criminal trial. The United States
Supreme Court in Harris v. New York1'2 held that statements
obtained in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights may
be used to impeach the accused when he takes the stand in
his defense. 2 3 Although the decision was limited to statements which were characterized as voluntary, uncoerced and
trustworthy,' 24 the significance of this limitation is doubtful
in view of a subsequent Supreme Court decision. In Oregon v.
Hass, 25 the statement used to impeach the defendant was obtained upon repeated questioning of the defendant after his
request for a lawyer had been denied by the police. It is possible to view this statement as falling somewhat short of the
"uncoerced and trustworthy" standard enunciated in Harris.
statement
Nonetheless, the court found the limited use of the
126
standards.
to be proper, at least by constitutional
The Harris decision did not address the issue of whether
silence of the defendant in the face of post-arrest questioning
could be used for impeachment purposes. The better argument is against the use of such evidence for at least two reasons. First, the silence of the accused is likely to have little
relevance to his credibility, especially after Miranda warnings
have been given, Remaining silent while in custody is sensible
behavior for a defendant and should have no bearing on his
truthfulness at trial. Secdnd, it is inconsistent with the basic
120.

121.

122.

See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968) in which the court held that
a limiting instruction was insufficient to remove the prejudice of a confession of
the codefendant which implicated the defendant.
The government should not have the windfall of having the jury be
influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law,
they should not consider but which they cannot put out of their minds.
WYO. R. CRIM. P. 13. Relief from Prejudicial Joinder.
If it appears that a defendant or the State is prejudiced by a joinder
of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information, or by such
joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate
trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever oth.
er relief justice requires.

401 U.S. 222 (1971).

123. Id. at 226.
124. Id. at 224.
125. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).

126. Id. at 723.
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philosophy of Miranda to offer the accused the right to re12 7
main silent and then penalize him for asserting that right.
The issue was presented to the Supreme Court in Doyle v.
Ohio.128 After their arrest for selling marijuana to an informant, the defendants in this case were given Miranda warnings and elected to remain silent. At their separate trials the
defendants claimed they had been framed by the narcotics
agents. For impeachment purposes the prosecution was allowed to ask them why they had not told the frameup story
to the arresting officer at the scene. The Supreme Court held
such use of a defendant's post-arrest silence to be impermissible:
Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing
more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda
rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly amthe State is required to adbiguous because of what
12 9
vise the person arrested.
RULE 106: REMAINDER OF OR
RELATED WRITINGS OR RECORDED STATEMENTS

30

When portions of writings or recorded statements are introduced there is a danger that admitting only a portion will
distort its meaning by pulling it out of context. 3 ' Limiting
the opponents remedy to putting the remainder in evidence
upon cross-examination is often inadequate for two reasons.
First, cross-examination is generally limited to the subject
matter of direct examination,132 so protection in this regard
is limited. Second, even if the opponent is able to introduce
the remainder of the evidence at a later point in the trial, this
will often be insufficient to eradicate the distorted first impression.133
127.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 43, at 325-36.

128.

426 U.S. 610 (1976).

129.

Id. at 617. The court added in a footnote that the holding does not prevent the use
of post arrest silence "to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory
version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest."

130.

Id. at 619 n.1l.
WYO. R. EVID. 106 provides:

131.
132.
133.

Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced
by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce
any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought
in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.
Kamp v. Kamp, 36 Wyo. 310,254 P. 689, 690 (1927).
WYO. R. EVID. 611(b), supra note 97.
MCcORMICK § 56, at 130; LOUISELL & MUELLER § 49, at 352.
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Rule 106 remedies the situation by allowing the opponent
to require the offering party to introduce other parts of the
writing or recording "which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it." The trial court retains the power to determine whether "fairness" requires the introduction
of the remainder. 34 If the additional evidence would merely
encumber the proceedings with irrelevant material, it may
properly be excluded despite the demand for its introduction.
Rule 106 may only be invoked by the adversary. The proponent may not claim the right to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence by characterizing it as a writing related to
one which he has introduced.3 4
One important application of this "rule of completeness"
occurs when admissions or confessions of the accused are introduced in a criminal case. 386 Thus, if the prosecution offers
the inculpatory portion of a written or recorded statement,
the defendant is entitled to have the exculpatory or self-serving parts introduced at the same time if they "ought in fariness to be considered contemporaneously." Although the
rule does not expressly apply to unwritten and unrecorded
statements, the same principle should apply. 1 7 Indeed, Wyoming case law indicates that "where part of a conversation is
put in evidence the adverse party is entitled to prove the remainder of the conversation."'' 3 However, in the context of
a criminal trial the accused may be forced to take the witness
stand in order to prove the remainder of the unrecorded statement. It may be a violation of the defendant's due process
and fifth amendment rights if he is compelled in this manner
to take the stand.
CONCLUSION

Article I does not represent a departure from the law of
evidence as it stands today in Wyoming. The real benefit of
the Rules is in the precedential value of the readily accessible
body of case law under the Federal Rules, especially in the
problem areas which are as yet unlitigated in Wyoming. In
106[01],at 106-4.

134.

WEINSTEIN

135.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 49, at 353.

136. See LOUISELL & MUELLER § 51.
137. Id. at 372.
138. State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1,298 P.2d 349, 361 (1956).
139.

LOUISELL & MUELLER § 51, at 373-74.
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those difficult areas, where no completely satisfactory answers
can be found, the Rules provide a mechanism for dealing
with the problems, and the attendant case law brings into
focus the various consequences of the choices to be made.
CYNTHIA J. OLSON
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